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MODERN EQUITY. By Harold Greville Hanbury. London: Stevens and Sons, Limited.
1935. pp. 1, 735.
Mr. Hanbury's new treatise will have little value of the sort usually called "practi-
cal" for American readers. As presently to be suggested, its subject matter will seem
largely unfamiliar. What is this "Modem" equity, and what has happened to the
older variety, the conventional, traditional, the eponymous equity, the equity that
Lord Nottingham systematized and Lord Eldon ossified? Moreover, Mr. Hanbury
has certainly no more than the average English writer's interest in or familiarity with
American legal phenomena; perhaps less. A few references to the late Dean Ames,
who it seems had the good sense to agree with the late Mr. Maitland, and to Mr. Scott,
who doesn't, a few citations to cases decided in the Supreme Court of the United
States, and a very small sprinkling-not more than could be counted on the fingers
of one hand-to American state decisions; that is virtually the whole sum.
However, for those readers who may be called curious or inquiring this book will
have much stimulation. If the English are insular, so are Americans, and the English
have the justification that after all they do live on an island. Differences are educa-
tional and this volume has several to offer.
The first noticeable difference is that the well-known English individualism applies
even to writing law books. For substance, our better American treatises can easily
stand comparison with the better English specimens, but in style and form they are
subject to a regimentation that should make Mr. Hoover shudder. American texts
look and sound much alike. A solemn, stilted, diffident and highly objective style is
considered good form; the American author does not come out forthrightly with his
opinion, but ventures to say, with deference, that it might be suggested that-and
so on. Mr. Hanbury is subject to no such inhibitions. He has opinions and strong
ones; he takes the reader into his confidence without hesitation. And Mr. Hanbury
likes a literary style that is a little on the florid side, one that abounds in figures of
speech. So he employs such a style, freely and with evident enjoyment. Often he
achieves vividness and real wit. Thus, speaking of the issuance of writs in the old
days, he says:1 "The river of law, whereof the Chancery was the source, flowed into
a lock of which the common law judges were the keepers, and only a thin trickle
came out on the other side." Some of his figures are less happy. He comments thus
on the claim of equitable rights to get into the category of iura in ren:2 "The angel with
the flaming sword who keeps them out of their Eden is the bona fide purchaser for
value." The bona fide purchaser is a favorite theme for the author's imagery. A
little later he appears, in one sentence,3 as both a bogey and a rare bird.
Furthermore, the author's general method of treatment is strikingly informal. He
offers less an ordered exposition of the subject than a commentary on points and prob-
lems that interest him. One fears that a student totally uninformed about equity
would not find this a very helpful introduction. It assumes too much to start with.
In the second chapter, for example, the student would find himself confronted with
trusts, vendor and purchaser, mortgages, and restrictive covenants all at once. He
might be more overwhelmed than enlightened.
This is by no means a criticism; it may be praise. There are plenty of books setting
forth the ABCs of equity. The writer here may be taken as saying to his reader:
1. P. 2. 2. P. 20.
3. P. 42.
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"You are familiar with the general outlines of this subject; I will discuss with you
the delicate, the obscure, the difficult, the new and the moot points. In doing so it
will be necessary at times to ignore the strictly logical order and to proceed instead
in a more intuitive way, following ideas as they expand, overlap and intertwine."
This may be a very good way to write a book; the one under review illustrates that.
It permits combining thoroughness and subtlety of treatment with relative brevity.
Who would not, for example, welcome a one-volume work on contracts by Mr. Willis-
ton, treating in detail just the parts of the subject which he regards as exceptionally
interesting, important and difficult? As already suggested, it makes for an exceptionally
readable book. The reviewer has read these six hundred and twenty-seven pages in
the period of a few days; what would be an unbearably tedious and stultifying task
in the case of the average American treatise has here been a pleasure.
Aside from style and arrangement, the most interesting general difference about this
book is just that one which has been mentioned as lessening its practical value: what
may be called its perspective, the way equity now looks to an English writer. Equity
a familiar name, turns out to be something in considerable part quite unfamiliar to
the average American reader. The present reviewer, though not wholly unfamiliar
.with English trends, may be more ignorant than most. Certainly the study of this
book as a whole has amazed-not to say somewhat appalled-him by bringing home
so forcefully both the narrowness of the subject matter on which English equity cen-
ters and the radical changes in technique and terminology that English statutes have
made. Equity in England means that part of the general jurisprudence which effec-
tuates and protects the family settlement. Scarcely more. That is the impression the
reader overwhelmingly gets. The author calls it the law of trusts. "The law of
trusts," he says in his preface,4 "is the mainspring of equity, and to the law of trusts
belongs the lion's share of treatment." But the law of trusts and the lav of settlements
are one and the same thing. Everything is thrust into this category or put aside for
not more than brief and casual treatment. "Under the law of trusts," Mr. Hanbury
continues, "is brought the law of mortgages, which are regarded primarily as trust in-
vestments; they are examined from the angle of the mortgagee rather than that of
the mortgagor." This will astonish the American lawyer, if not the English one. On
the other hand, matters that bulk large in American books on equity cut little figure
here. Specific performance is dealt with in twenty-five pages, injunctions in forty.
There seems to be no treatment of bills quia timet, nor of bills of peace nor of inter-
pleader. The vendor-purchaser relationship is dealt with very sketchily. Equally
sketchy and piecemeal is the treatment given to the mechanics of equity, that is, such
matters as the nature, enforcement and effect of equitable decrees.
Again, this law of trusts is scarcely one with which we are familiar. The law of
settlements has never been particularly comprehensible to the average American
reader; under the Settled Land Acts and the Law of Property Acts and the Trustee
Acts and others it is less comprehensible than ever. No doubt the difficulty is in
part a matter of terminology; unfamiliar expressions suggest a difference greater than
the one that actually exists. Careful study discloses many familiar realities under
unfamiliar names. But more real unfamiliarities remain. We over here have allowed
equity for the most part to have a natural growth along natural lines. In England,
on the other hand, its growth has both been unnaturally forced and unnaturally
twisted into new shapes by statute. Some of the modifications appear palpably scien-
tific and reasonable. One wonders why they have no counterpart here. Others seem
needlessly extreme and arbitrary. But this is not the place (nor is the writer com-
petent) to comment in detail on these changes; the purpose is more to comment on




Some old standbys remain. No English book would be complete without some
discussion of the great (but, in the writer's opinion, largely unimportant) question
whether equitable interests are Jura in rem or Jura in personam. Mr. Hanbury does
not disappoint us. His statement about the angel with the flaming sword has already
been quoted. And there is no doubt where Mr. Hanbury's heart is in the matter.
Without a firm belief in what he calls "Maitland's slogan" we should be led, he says,
"into regarding much of our legal system as chaotic and meaningless," And yet there
is a flaw, a "really vital flaw." This is the right of the beneficiary to "follow" trust
funds. This latter right, he says,5 "shows that equitable rights are a great deal
higher than mere Jura in personam, for the beneficiary emphatically claims a pro-
prietary right, and will recover the property in specie; he will not be relegated to a
mere right to a dividend like an ordinary creditor of the trustee."
This is interesting, though not wholly novel. Nor is it wholly convincing. All
concede that the beneficiary is entitled to reclaim the original trust corpus in specie,
if it has not got into the hands of a bona fide purchaser. This either does or does
not amount to ius in. rem. Either way, the answer is not affected by the existence of
an anomolous doctrine under which the claimant is allowed to exercise apparently
proprietary rights after the original trust corpus has ceased to exist or, at least, to be
subject to the original claim. It is the existence of this extraordinary doctrine which
cries out fdr comment, and not its bearing on the original nature of the beneficiary's
rights. The reviewer's real disappointment arises from the fact that Mr. Hanbury,
after treating the right to trace as of such importance, nevertheless fails to give it
the searching analysis it so cries out for. Is there any current legal concept that can
be compared with this one, both for municipal acceptance and for the palpable harm
which that uncritical acceptance does? In quasi contracts, the fiction of implied
contract has been pretty thoroughly exploded by American scholars. There is even
some suggestion that Mr. Hanbury himself has recently achieved enlightenment-
or had it thrust upon him-in this matter.6 But the tracing doctrine still flourishes.
Courts and writers persist in the fiction that when the horse is sold it is in some mysteri-
ous way physically transmuted into the proceeds.7 The real idea obviously (as else-
where where constructive trust is involved) is remedial. Equity looks unfavorably
on the proposition that a wrongdoer should by misdealing with P's property either
(a) make a profit for himself, or (b) change P's status (for the worse) from that of
owner to that of creditor. In either case (and the latter is of course by far the
most common and important) P has ordinarily no particular interest in the identity
of the proceeds. He asks only to be protected from one or the other of the threatened
wrongs. This can be done, and usually is, by giving him money.8 Calling it P's
5. P. 60.
6. Mr. Hanbury's "Essays in Equity," published in 1934, is unfortunately not available
to the present reviewer but from Mr. Chafee's stimulating review of it, in 49 HARv. L. RiEv.
523, it would appear that Mr. Hanbury as lately as that expressed views on quasi contract
much narrower than those to be found in the present treatise. See, e.g., page 58 of the
latter, where he admits that "there really was much to be said for" Lord Mansfield's Ideas of
quasi contract.
7. Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled With Other Money (1913)
27 HAv. L. Rav. 125, at 129, in speaking of the presumption that a trustee who withdraws
money from a mixed fund is presumed to be honest and to intend to withdraw his own money
first, says: "This is, of course, a pure fiction, and as usually happens when a proper result
is reached by fictitious reasoning, has led to erroneous results in other cases." It is strange
that Mr. Scott does not point out that the whole doctrine is based on a "pure fiction."
8. If D, the wrongdoer, trades P's horse for a cow, and P is allowed to have the cow,
this is not because P is fond of that cow or of cows in general; it is clearly because In the
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property "in an altered form" neither improves the remedy nor (so far as one knows)
makes P feel any better-but it does badly befuddle the issue. It makes the remedy
depend on things done after the wrong was committed, e.g., on whether the wrongdoer
first mixes the money with his own or goes at once and pays a debt with it. The same
harm is done to P in either case; he is entitled to the same remedy.0 But he doesn't
get it.
Here would be a very good place for Mr. Hanbury's angel with the flaming sword;
he would be much better employed straightening out this mess than in keeping dis-
embodied iura out of a hypothetical Eden. Absent an angel, the courts or, better,
the legislatures should re-analyze the problem. Realistically the question inheres in
the origin of the fund, not its subsequent history. Was or was not the transaction
one whereby P should be compelled to assume the position of a mere creditor? He
is no longer in any realistic sense the owner of anything. Permitting him to trace
creates a fictitious ownership better described as what it really is: a valid claim to a
preference. Any one who has read the advance sheets of late years under the heading
"Banks and Banking" will hardly fail to agree that the tracing of trust funds has added
a new horror to the depression. It might be done away with by abandoning the fiction
of tracing and working out a scientific scheme of preferences.
If Mr. Hanbury has missed an opportunity here, he has gloriously taken one else-
where. In Section Two of his chapter on Cancellation and Rectification he has given
the most illuminating brief discussion of fraud, particularly of the distinction between
fraud in law and in equity, that the writer has ever run across. Fraud, he says, is, or
should be, one thing: what equity regards "as a conveniently comprehensive word for
the expression of a lapse in the high standard of conscientiousness that it exacted from
a party occupying a certain contractual or fiduciary relation towards another party."1 0
Quite different is the common law idea of deceit as defined in Pasley v. Freeman and
Derry v. Peek. "The whole law would have been simpler had common law been con-
tent to use the word 'deceit' and leave 'fraud' to equity. We should then have had
the perfectly simple proposition, that common law will give an action of damages for
deceit while equity will, on the ground either of deceit or of fraud, grant cancellation,
order the restoration of the property, or withhold specific performance." n But neither
law nor equity has been thus content; in consequence we have equitable fraud and legal
fraud and moral fraud and actual fraud and constructive fraud and so on. The Judica-
ture Act of 1873 and the American codes (though of course the author does not men-
tion them) have made the confusion worse. Courts of law have adopted the equitable
definition in some phases; courts of equity appear at times to be limiting themselves
by the legal definition.
Mr. Hanbury unfortunately has no power to end this confusion, but his analysis
of it is recommended to every student. At once apparent it is how useful such a
definition of fraud would be, for example, in constructive trust cases or in determining
whether the relief sought in a given case was legal or equitable. He goes on in a
strikingly compact and lucid way to illustrate and define various types of what is
properly fraud in equity and to show the application thereto of the appropriate equit-
able remedies. Considerations of space forbid illustration or any further summary
particular case the cow is more valuable than the horse or a judgment in trover againzt D.
9. As far as creditors go, they in general have to take their chances on what their debtor
does with his property. The ordinary argument that, in the case put, to allow P a prefer-
ence is unfair to D's other creditors seems quite to overlook the benefit (at P's expena) to
the one who was paid.
10. P. 602. 11. P. 602.
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of his position here. In conclusion it may be said that the reviewer found this the
most stimulating chapter of a book that is never less than stimulating.
Iowa City, Ia. PHILIP MECHEMf
LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN K p McMuRRAY. Edited by Max Radin and
A. M. Kidd. University of California Press. 1935. Pp. x, 694.
TWENTY-FOUR essays, of which some have already appeared elsewhere and others
will, are here bound together. Six are by deans and ex-deans of American law
schools (Judge Henry, McGovney, Masterson, Justin Miller, Pound, Wigniore).
Two are by French professors of civil law (Capitant, Josserand). Except for one
by a lawyer who has managed without teaching to become a scholar (Schechter), the
others are by American teachers and ex-teachers of law (Bingham, Bohlen, W. E.
Colby, Costigan, E. D. Dickinson, Capt. A. D. Hoover, Hudson, Langmaid, Llewellyn,
Macneil, Maggs, E. M. Morgan, Radin, Schiller, Yntema). None of the essays is
without interest for some readers. And the well-honoring of Dean McMurray is
assured by several whose import can scarcely fail of weight for many.
Some of the essays convey information about special subjects, without advocacy.
Others include advocacies. And still others are of deep and general interest to
inquirers into the joint or several natures of law and justice.
This review would become completely desultory if, in dealing with the essays of
the class first mentioned, it did much more than mention their respective matters.
Yntema's is about the American Law Institute. McGovney, after warning off
readers who lack time for intricate legal curiosities, works out the interesting and far
from idle puzzle of just what classes of persons are "nationals" but not citizens
of the United States. Under the title The Growing Lawlessness of Trees, Sayre
Macneil playfully expounds what courts have held about encroaching roots and
branches. He finds pleasant anomolies. Self-help is still the only approved remedy
for most tree-troubles between neighbors. But where leaves poison horses or roots
pollute a well, the epithet "noxious" may warrant damages or injunction. The
epithet is withheld, however, from roots which clog sewers. Manley Hudson states
doctrines, in abstraction from their applications, by which the Permanent Court of
International Justice professes to be guided in interpreting international engagements.
Justin Miller deals with "the criminal act." Captain Hoover presents the substance
of statutes and decisions about army courts-martial; Dean Masterson, of construc-
tions of the power of courts to decree specific performance under the Sales Acts;
Schiller, of Roman rules as to business dealings between patrons and freedmen.
W. E. Colby follows miners' "customs of the diggings" from the middle ages into
California and its water law.
In eight essays advocacy adds interest to legal exposition. In each the advocacy
is of something advanced or serviceable to what I venture to call justice. Most of
the authors prefer to call it, if anything, something else: soundness of legal, social,
economic or juridical policy; social needs; the objects of legal doctrines; fairness,
social desirability, expediency, practicality, reasonableness or common sense; superior
claims in conscience; humanity and wise public policy. Whatever they call it, all,
Bingham excepted, leave it undefined.
Bingham, though he gives no comprehensive definition, states definitely the stand-
ard by which he gauges justice (calling it legal soundness) in the California law of
riparian rights. It is maximum beneficial use of flowing water. Though sympathetic
tProfessor of Law, University of Iowa Law School.
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with the "pious hope" of engineers for a "scientific plan of development and con-
servation, with an adjustment to uses unhampered by technical vested rights of little
public advantage," he has no confidence that it can soon be realized through
legislation. So his adroit brief seeks to show that the principle of maximum beneficial
use, though not always observed in California decisions, is nevertheless well sup-
ported in them. Therefore, without violence to judicial tradition, the courts can use
it, if they will, to escape or limit rules and precedents inconsistent with it, thus
coming without legislative legislation close to just regulation of the use of flowing
water.
Most of the other advocacies are, like Bingham's, of substituting some just or
juster principle or way of dealing for one or another set of authoritative legal
practices or precepts. Costigan, challenging the mighty shade of John Chipman Gray,
supports "trusts which are miscalled 'spendthrift' "-provided courts can be got to
desist from decisions premised upon donors' rights to dispose property as they will
and to limit beneficiaries' protection to needs which humanity and conscience will
determine by the measure of their unfitness to take good care of themselves in a
world of wolves. Langmaid wants the courts to be juster in permitting "contribu-
tive subrogation" in situations where each of two or more sureties or quasi-sureties
(in a forged check case, for instance, the surety on the forger's fidelity bond and
the bank which honored the check) is, or might fairly be made, severally liable for
the whole loss due to the principal's dereliction, and one of them has had to make
it good. Morgan wants courts to stop fuddling juries with precedent-required
charges as to presumptions and burden of proof. Judge Henry (in a tail-piece to an
outline of the history of the criminal jury) recommends that we consider replacing
the criminal jury with a tribunal recruited from our "best citizens," as now in Italy.
There the good quality of popular judges is assured by limiting eligibility to persons
who are or have been members of the great council of the Fascisti, important public
officials, military officers, authors, scientists or artists, or holders of university degrees.
He also wants jury trial abolished in civil cases. Bohlen, on the other hand, believes
that since judges tend to tie themselves with rules, reasonableness under circum-
stances would more often be well determined if judges referred it to juries with less
circumscription. This is but one incident to Bohlen's comprehensive advocacy of
attention to "the reality of what the courts are doing." He hopes that by looking
beyond the words which judges use to what they use them for, we may approach
definiteness as to when, whether, and to what extent doctrinal apparatus is used for
"socially desirable ends." Though traditional conventions will not soon disappear,
the spread of awareness of conventional disingenuousness may increase the frequency
with which judges will "tell the real reasons for their decisions and not conceal them
beneath legalistic and often meaningless phrases."
Though few of the contributors would avow this much conversion to legal
"realism," only two of the advocacies in the volume seem out of accord with the
view that justice would be served by freeing law from the shams and shackles of
tradition. One is Wigmore's. His conclusion is that the doctrine of consideration
in contract is "fair and practical." This seems to me a non-sequitur of the analysis
through which he purports to reach" it-a parallel columning of the conventional
requisites of contract, deceit and estoppel, presented as three species of the legal
genus "Assertory Obligations or Obligative Assertions" Though Wigmore may be
right that appropriateness to type of situation (meaning justice?) prescribes the dif-
ference in requisites characteristic of each species, close consideration of a vast
number of cases in the light of an agreed and definite standard of justice would seem
essential to demonstration. The other advocacy which may seem to sound in Cokian
tradition is Dickinson's-of inflexibile adherence to the rule that when a person or
thing seized abroad, in violation of international law, has been reached by process
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of a court of the state into which it has been brought, that court must adjudicate
nothing except that it has no jurisdiction. It is not asserted that the rule is just.
All that is said for it is that it is law. Yet perhaps as strong a case could be made
for the justice of inflexible adherence to it as for any advocacy in the volume,
The only universally accepted test of justice is a just man's feeling-usually one's
own. Feeling responds, with differences due to different habits and contents of mind,
to the circumstances seen as relevant. To many sets and sorts of circumstances, seen
in a narrow frame which isolates them from others, the reactions of justice or in-
justice of nearly all fairly decent persons substantially agree-for instance when
the question is as to whether contribution should be required when two sureties are
severally liable to make good a loss, and probably also when the question is of trying
in Texas a notorious murderer who would not.be in reach of Texas courts if he had
not been kidnapped from Mexico. But when the frame of relevance is enlarged
and other circumstances seen within it, feelings of justice often differ widely. How
many persons can feel as just a way of dealing which threatens any welfare, their
own or general, about which they care deeply? Dickinson, bringing world condi-
tions within his frame, might argue justice (though I am not sure that my own
feelings accept the argument) somewhat thus: Wars may result from cumulations
of trifling blows to national dignities. And international law is as feeble as was
the common law in its beginnings. The cause of justice among nations can best
be served by medieval rigor in all adjudication that touches international relations
even lightly.
Of the contributions to the volume which say most about the natures of law and
justice, Max Radin's is least remote from things I have here been saying. It is a
piece without footnotes but with much learning and more sense, including a lightly
ironic sense of humor. Neither adjectives nor my snap-shot summary can convey
anything of its fine flavor. A Juster Justice, A More Lawful Law, is its title. It is
a condensed world history of conceptions of justice.
To primitive peoples, who must have felt the thing before they had a word for
it, justice meant to each his right or due or what is fitting, as fixed by unchalleng-
able customs. Our word, remember, derives from ins. Schechter's contribution, The
Law and Morals of Primitive Trade (which deserves but will not have more than
this passing mention), richly illustrates primitive justice and devices to secure it, and
adds to Radin's the fact that, to savages, what was due commonly included self-
interested but generous reciprocity.
As "progress" enlarged societies, destroying internal harmonies and stripping due-
ness of generosity, traditional justice became cruel. The generous and the oppressed
sensed and combined to press for a juster justice, into which compassion entered.
And justice has never since been clear and unconfused. Now one and now another
compound of elements which will not blend has been pushed to precarious pre-
dominance, never quite displacing others.
The contributions from France are beautifully lucid expositions of responses in law
to a conception of justice for which there has been as much fighting here as there,
If, as may be inferred from M. Louis Josserand's La Protection des Faibles par le
Droit, the feeble have gained less legal protection here than there, the greater judicial
protection which our Constitution gives the strong doubtless accounts for it. Even
in France, however, the eviction from law of the notion that there should be no
liability without fault is not quite complete. But "the concept of fault, which came
from the depths of the Roman law, sounds more and more in the past; after having
effectively consecrated it, our courts content themselves with dropping it some
curtsies." They have set up presumptions of fault; sometimes they have con-
tractualized responsibility. They tend to forget fault completely. This counter.
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principle to no liability without fault, if not yet quite legal in France, is so neatly
articulate and strongly backed that it should soon become so:
"The author of damage is responsible, not as culpable, but .. because it is he
who has created, in his own interest or in the course of his functioning, the risk
from which damage has become a fact; though morally irreproachable, be ought
to indemnify the victim of his undertaking, of his initiative, of his action."
M. Josserand finds in the efficacy with which Continental courts and legislatures
protect the feeble a soul-satisfying refutation of the "singular illusion which some-
times makes us see in the commandments of the law the consecration of might."
He says that a legal command is, on the contrary, "an imperative imposed on all by
the sentiment of the mass or popular conscience."
Any illusion that France has become a Utopia for the feeble will be dispeled by
M. Henri Capitant's La Propritg Commerciale. Alost French businesses are still
small. But latterly, especially since the war, big businesses have been increasing.
Most of the small "independents" operate in rented premises. To survive in com-
petition they have had to build a different sort of good-will than they used to need
when their customers came because they liked them or their shops were near. So
they have modernized their shops or plants and wares and services, at for them, great
expense. The terms of their leases are rarely very long. Before 1926 war-time
emergency legislation gave them some protection. But they were in danger of finding
themselves at the mercy of their landlords upon its expiration. After a long hard
fight in Parlement and at the polls between the justice of compassion and the justice
of to each his right, a law was passed, far from completely satisfactory to either.
It provides that if a landlord consents to renew an industrial or commercial lease
upon its expiration, but the parties cannot agree on terms, arbitrators or a court
shall fix them; and that a business man whose landlord refuses to renew shall be
entitled to indemnity if the refusal was without good reason (motif grave et h1gilme)
or if within six years a business which profits from the improvements made during
his tenancy is carried on in the premises. This law has produced a prodigious flood
of litigation. It has resulted, in spite of the depression, in substantial increase in
the sales values of businesses, and consequently in the prices of goods and the cost
of living. M. Capitant thinks that Parlement, succumbing to the political influence
of mercantile associations, has cut down great principles without sufficient reason.
That the idea of law has got as badly confused as that of justice is well shovn
in the new More About the Nature of Law which Dean Pound contributes to the
volume. After arraying definitions by many men of many standpoints, times and
places, Dean Pound finds it impossible to synthesize a conception of law which
takes them all into account. He concludes, however, that all ways of looking at or
behind law, however it be conceived, have value for the object of jurisprudence,
which is understanding "of a specialized form of social control through the orderly
and systematic application of the force of politically organized society." I should
like to amend to "whether or not orderly or systematic", and to deny the existence
of value for the desired understanding in the way of looking at law as a thing in
which ideal attributes or ends inhere. When that way has value it is for other ends.
That the conception of law need not remain confused is one of the lessons of the
two essays still unmentioned: Karl Llewellyn's The Constitution as an Institution
and Douglas Maggs's The Constitution and the Recovery Legislation: the R6les of
Document, Doctrine and Judges. The Constitution, as they show it to be, is repre-
sentative of what all law is. Llewellyn's study of it, indeed, results mainly in cor-
roboration (not without extension) of insights to which he had come through study
of private law.
It implies no disparagement of the work of many others, especially Corwin and
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Beard, without which it could scarcely have been possible, to say that Maggs's is
the most informing exposition that has been written of cardinal facts about the
present constitutional law of the Supreme Court. Though several of its historical
statements seem to me incorrect, they do not materially lessen its usefulness for
practical purposes of the present. I shall state only the broadest of its conclusions.
Though the Court is by no means fully freed from restraints fairly ascribable to
the document, it has got far towards being so. "The freedom of the judges of today
to decide cases as they think best (resulting from the part their own wisdom plays
in construing and interpreting clauses in the written Constitution, in pronouncing
doctrines under the due process clauses, in the development and application of
doctrines and past decisions, in determining whether or not to repudiate old doctrine
and overrule past decisions) is so great that their statesmanship plays a far greater
part in the determination of what statutes are constitutional than do either the
words of the document or the pronouncements of their predecessors."
Llewellyn's way of describing our actual Constitution seems preferable for legal
science, but not yet for easily intelligible communication with the legal profession.
The Constitution, he says, is not a document. It is an institution, like that of
England-with which suppositions of the authority of documents have had and have
important relations. An institution is a distinguishable set of interrelated ways or
usages-ways of believing, feeling and valuing as well as ways of doing. Our
constitutional ways include respect for the Document. And many of them are
consistent with its provisions. But "the working Constitution is in good part utterly
extra-Documentary (the privilege of Senatorial filibuster; the powers of the Con-
ference Committee; the President's power of removal)." "Wherever there are today
established practices 'under' or 'in accordance with' the Document, it is only tha
practice which can legitimatize the words as being still part of our going Constitution.
It is not the words which legitimatize the practice. . . .Discretion in the electoral
college is the classic example."
Llewellyn says that the Institution comprises all ways that can affect it-those of
"interested groups" and the "general public" as well as those of "specialists in
government." It seems to me more convenient to conceive an institution as com-
prising only the administrative ways (which of course are also legislative) of its
direct administrators-in the case of the Constitution, officials of the executive and
legislative departments (each also institutions, comprising others) as well as judges.
There is no need of conceiving an institution so broadly that all forces which count
in maintaining and changing it can be said to operate from within it. A conception
of the Constitution limited as I have suggested would comport better with
Llewellyn's earlier definition of law--'what officers do about disputes." This I take
it should now be revised to mean that law consists of the ways of official dealing of
officials who, in Dean Pound's language, deal with the adjustment of relations backed
by the force of politically organized society. That conception would work well for
most purposes in the pursuit of legal understanding. But of course lawyers will
have to keep on calling doctrines law as long as courts do.
The scientific character of Llewellyn's essay is blotted by a few laxities, of which
I shall mention one. It was he himself who not long since pleaded eloquently for
a "clean-limbed descriptive science" of law whose descriptions would be "uncon-
taminated by our desires and ideals." Yet here, in order, as he says, that "the real
nature of the Constitution as an institution may stand forth," he purports to find the
source of what Maggs calls "surreptitious judicial amendments" in the "needs" of
government or of society, later qualified to "needs of the day as the Court felt them."
Such inconsiderate use of "needs" is frequent in other essays in the volume. It has
been common since 1881, when Holmes ascribed the growth and change of law to
"the felt necessities of the time." Holmes had the practical justification that this
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:softened the shock of the first important legal heterodoxy in the United States.
Can it now be justified in a clean-limbed descriptive science? Whose needs (or
should it be demands?), and for what, were mainly served by constitutional changes
in the chief justiceships of Marshall and Fuller, and in the period when justices ap-
pointed by President Harding were a majority of the majority of the Court?
Perhaps I may seem unduly captious about a casual use of a usual locution. It
is dear from Llewelyn's essay as a whole that he does not really idealize the living
Constitution. I am far from wanting to find fault with him. I believe, indeed that
the possibility of true science of law owes as much to him as to anyone after
Holmes. Mly deep concern is to protest against the practice of loose valuation,
whether in advocacy or in courtesy.
It is usual to assume that demonstrably true or scientific value judgments are
impossible. And I think it true that there can be no proof of the validity of any
standard of value unless with reference to some other. But if questions of value
were always complicated with for wlat and whom and under what conditions, only
ignorance, perhaps not irreparable forever, could make true answers impossible. In
malarial conditions quinine is good for nearly everyone's health. And if we could
agree that the standard of justice should be, for instance, conduciveness to generality
of satisfactory living, and bend ourselves to scientific investigation of values for
justice so conceived, we might, through much error but with increasing certainty as
our knowledge grew, approach a science of justice which could guide legal advocacies,
large as well as small, less unreliably than most of them are guided now.
Yale Law School WALTER NELLESt
CASES AND MATERIALS ON Tnn LAW o FUTURE INTERESTS. By IV. Barton Leach,
Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1935. Pp. vdv, 1025.
AT last it has been done. Professor Leach has achieved the publication of a
humane casebook, and that, of all subjects, upon the Law of Future Interests. This
reviewer shared the opinion of most lawyers that it could not be done. But here
it is. And, moreover, the book is redolent of the fine flavor of sound scholarship
and professional skill. The work comes out none the worse, but only better for its
humanity and its modernity.
The makers of casebooks have much to answer for at the bar of student opinion.
They have taken much of the joy from the lives of law students condemned to read
through huge books of devitalized cases, and robbed them of the zest that would
lead them to read more. What the law really deals with is human beings. The
basic function of the judges is to resolve contests between human beings; contests
that arise out of conflicting interests and clashing wills of men. The subsequent
attempts to arrange the standards of decision into a pattern is but ancillary to the
main purpose of preventing the breaking of heads. The particular subject matter
which causes the dispute between individuals, or between greater or smaller groups of
men, whether it be beans, pigs, bonds, mortgage foreclosures, vage disputes or
what not is important only as conditioning the function of the judge, which is to
decide the controversy before him in such manner that his decision will be generally
approved, accepted by the parties, and afford a wise standard of conduct for other
men who pass that way. All this the student senses. What he most desires and
-needs, as does the judge who decides the case, is the facts out of which the contest
fAssociate Professor of Law.
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arose; and of this fact-situation the most important element is the human equation
present.
But what has been the general tendency of casebook making since the originals were
published by the Harvard Olympians, now half a century in the past? The human
element has steadily faded. Due to the ever growing desire to increase the number
of cases presented, need for space economy gradually drew all personality from the
factual background of the problem presented for solution. First the names of
counsel are omitted, then the procedural facts grow dimmer and dimmer, often dis-
appearing entirely. The judge is usually but a name, and the litigants have no more
personality than the letters of the alphabet, often used to represent them. The last
stage of this descending progress is the summarized case, or case abstract. Such
abstracts, while good enough when posing problems for class discussion, or as
illustrating factual variations of the issue presented by some principal case, when used
as substitutes for reported cases are always inadequate, and frequently confusing or
even misleading. The considered statement of a competent text-writer on the problem
presented in the case abstract would be far clearer and more trustworthy.
But certainly this criticism cannot be made of Professor Leach's work. Here the
human element looms large, sometimes even jovial, in the development of this sub-
ject, traditionally regarded as the driest and dreariest of all in the curriculum. Thus,
for example, Perrin v. Blake,' (at p. 131) is not left merely as a decision, which,
with its reversal in the Exchequer Chamber, illustrates a peculiarly harsh applica-
tion of the Rule in Shelley's Case. With the aid of the editor's deft annotation, the
case appears as a highly dramatic event in the history of English law. Something
of the quality and temperament of the great Chief Justice who presided over the
King's Bench, is flashed before the reader with this note (p. 132), "From the pas-
sages which follow one may acquire enough insight into the personality of Lord Chief
Justice Mansfield to guess that those who disliked his views might feel strongly about
him. The bitterness of the Perrin v. Blake controversy would be incomprehensible had
a less egocentric character been involved." It becomes plain that Lord Mansfield,
who would be called a "liberal" judge in our times, and who had in the field of
commercial law successfully used the functional approach long before that phrase
was popularized or even invented, in order to refashion many an antiquated rule,
failed signally when he attempted to use the same technique in the field of property,
where countless titles might be overturned by reckless reformers. In order to ex-
hibit this dramatic event, with all of its implications, the editor sacrifices more than
two pages of his cherished space to the delightfully ironical letter sent by Charles
Fearne, author of the famous "Essay on Contingent Remainders and Executory
Devises," in a crushing reply to a comment made by Mansfield from the bench deny-
ing the accuracy of a previously published statement by Fearne. It is safe to say
that this treatment of Perrin v. Blake will afford the student a better understanding
of the doctrine of stare decisis, of the limitations upon judicial law making, and of
the essential nature of property law, than would a volume of logically ordered essays,
or a score of unilluminated cases. A similar treatment is given Thellusson v. Wood-
ford (p. 796), which involved the will of an eccentric eighteenth century capitalist,
who sought to eclipse the fame of Croesus by tying up his fabulous fortune to be
accumulated for the better part of a century. But Peter Thellusson reckoned with-
out a knowledge of the erosive qualities of long continued litigation which such a
will invited.
Throughout the collection the editor's lively fancy is reflected in footnotes of a
kind never before seen in a casebook, which, with a sort of impish wit and kindly
sarcasm, throw into high light some absurd fact situation, or some unusual per-
1. 1 W. BI. 672 (K. B. 1769).
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sonality involved in the cases reported. For this purpose his citations and quota-
tions range all the way from Genesis to Galsworthy's "Forsyte Saga," from The
Boston American to the Boston Transcript. Three times he lifts paragraphs from the
spicy columns of Time. Indeed the notes on page 117 and on page 241 ("No! No!
A thousand times, No!") are so puckish that one almost suspects that the misprint of
"joint" instead of "point," at page 747, was not wholly unintentional!
But of all Professor Leach's footnotes, the masterpiece is easily that on p. 220, in
which the editor sets out the results of his research in the biographic mystery of
"That great man, Mr. Pooley." It is unnecessary to remind the learned reader
that "That great man, Mr. Pooley," is mentioned hauntingly in that now classic
dialogue between Professor Gray and a student, which our editor reprints from Gray's
Perpetuities [(3d ed.) p. 587 note], but no one has seemed to know anything about
him, or why he was so great. But nothing daunted, the editor took up the trail
with industry and acumen that would have done honor to the keenest "G Mlan" in
all the pages of the Saturday Evening Post. And did he run down the mysterious Air.
Pooley? Gentle reader, look at the note. It alone is worth the price of the book.
But turning from these unusual and wholly delightful features which, perchance,
some unseeing persons may think trivial, we find an admirable collection of well
selected and edited materials, cases, statutes and textual comment, with annotation
both learned and pungent. The work undoubtedly derives from the fifth volume of
Gray's Cases on Property. But can any one compile a teachable collection of cases on
Future Interests without trailing more or less faithfully after that great master?
Here there is some shifting in the order of topics, some changes in chapter and
section captions-well made, too,--yet the analysis is substantially the same. But
if the bony structure is the same, the spirit that lives within the rib basket is not.
The emphasis is so shifted as to make the purpose of the work notably different.
Gray's book is but a glorified chapter in the history of English law,-and glorious
it is, with its masterly scholarship and its steady precision of purpose,-but the
student who wishes to learn the art of modem conveyancing in America must needs
look elsewhere. But every section of the work before us shows the touch of a
skillful conveyancer, one who has had to draft wills and trust settlements, and who
is fully aware of the innumerable hazards that attend upon such actions. The ease
with which the draftsman might have avoided the inadequacies, oversights and
ambiguities in wills and settlements which brought about the wasteful litigation ex-
hibited in the cases reported, is constantly, and sometimes gleefully, pointed out. To
illustrate how tax-waste may be avoided (no tax-evasion, mind you!) the editor
brings forward no less a document than the will of Calvin Coolidge. "Conforming
to a world-famous habit of laconic expression, he wrote his will as follows: 'Not
unmindful of my son, John, I give all my estate, both real and personal, to my wife,
Grace Coolidge, in ,fee simple.' It may be assumed that an ex-President of the
United States felt it beneath his dignity to minimize the federal taxes which would be
payable upon the transfers from himself to his widow and from his widow to his
son. Yet the fact remains that the use of a simple power of appointment would in all
probability have reduced by nearly 50 per cent the depletion by federal taxes of his
testator's estate." But after all, the Elysian joys of the spirit of the frugal New
Englander should not be seriously diminished when he learns of this oversight, for
he can be reasonably sure that a watchful Treasury will not allow even such a tiny
hole in the revenue net to remain long unclosed. But the point is well made.
The quotation made above is from the Introduction to Part III, which treats of
Powers of Appointment. It illustrates the editor's use of a new device in casebook
making. Every important division of the work carries an "introduction," which
the compiler uses as a means of inserting assorted bits of information and suggestion,
but principally as a sort of pedagogic headnote, showing in very summary form what
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relation the cases selected bear to the development of the topic treated. Example
(p. 576):
"The law of powers also gives to the lawyer an occasional agreeable opportunity
to perform a minor miracle. See, for instance, Doe v. Jones (p. 586) and In re
Evered (p. 687)."
At first view these summarizing headnotes would seem to be just what the teacher
doesn't want, a sort of elegantly faint SPITZ pony; but such is not the case. Pro-
fessor Leach's introductory paragraphs stop far short of giving the student his answer,
but do serve to whet his curiosity and afford him some very much needed preliminary
guidance. This device serves a very useful purpose, and it is to be hoped that it will
be further developed.
One casually turning the pages of this collection and finding his attention caught
by the large numbers of recent statutes, including revenue and bankruptcy acts, and
the great array of recent American cases included, might well say: "Quite so.
Modem and one-hundred per cent American!" But a more careful examination
reveals that nearly all of the ancient landmarks, and the favorite later English cases
found in Gray's collection has also been included. A count shows that of the 231
cases more or less fully reported, 86 are English and 145 American. Of the latter
49 were decided after 1920.
Of course, no self-respecting review should fail to set forth the defects in the work
reviewed and the divers mistakes made by the author. But already this review has
transcended its allotted space; and as for the defects in the book, they seem quite
unimportant. So why mention them?
W. R. VAc.t
Yale Law School
THE LONG AND SHORT HAUL PRINCIPLE OF RATE REGULATION. By Ralph L. Dewey.
1935. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press. Pp. ix, 287. Ohio State
SuPPosE that the entire transportation industry of the country were a complete
monopoly. By its rate tariffs alone it could regulate our lives in almost any detail.
It could subsidize some industries or, indeed, some individual shippers, at the expense
of others. It could regulate wages, hours and employment relations in industries de-
pendent on transportation. It could make or break towns, industrial and marketing
centers, politics and politicians. It could settle and resettle industries and popula-
tions. It could raise and depress prices. It could do much that governmental regula-
tion, taxation and spending have done or have been unable to do. It could do all
that for its own benefit, or out of sheer malevolence or for what it deemed to be
the public good.
The process would, of course, be very unnatural. It would interfere with the
proper, if not inexorable, functioning of economic laws, would violate states' rights,
would abridge inviolate liberties of the individual (and corporation), would
exceed the powers of the federal government and would transgress all limitations
upon the powers delegated by the people. It would be very unconstitutional. The
ancient way is to shun such monopoly, to have an industry composed of a number of
units each without complete control and each vieing with the others for its own
benefit. Since no one can be trusted with full power to determine what is for the
public good and how it is to be attained, trust is placed in the natural process of
individual self-seeking as a wise and efficient selector.
But there was something awry about this natural process in the railroad industry.
Railroads did discriminate between shippers, commodities and localities. They did
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
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subsidize some to the oppression of others. They did it sometimes, perhaps, be-
cause of malevolence toward somebody; at other times. because of coercion by
somebody with power, for example, the Standard Oil Trust; but generally, because
in their competition for traffic they saw in their chosen conduct the maximum of ulti-
mate or immediate profit for themselves. They were able to do it, so it was thought,
because some lines or parts of lines were little monopolies in their own territories.
Consciously or otherwise, planlessly or according to plan, the railroads did regulate
social and economic affairs in a manner deemed to be forbidden even to government.
Therefore the government began to regulate the railroads to prevent the railroads
from retaliating others. Railroads were to be deprived of the power which monopoly
gave them to practice discriminations which unequal competition compelled. They
were to continue under private ownership and management; but they were re-
quired to behave as if they were competing with somebody at all points so that
the benefits of the natural processes could be realized. Railroad rates were to be
no higher than reasonable. Discrimination, that is, unreasonable discrimihation,
between individuals, between commodities or between localities (which did not in-
clude ports until Congress said "ports"') was forbidden in general terms. One obvious
form of discrimination received special proscription: a carrier was not to charge or
receive any greater compensation for transportation of passengers or of like kind of
property for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, the shorter
being included within the longer distance. Here is an open and obvious form of
discrimination. Enforcement of its prohibition should be easy. The prohibition
does not enjoin discrimination; it does not regulate the relationship between the long
and short haul rates. It enjoins only the extreme abuse, a greater charge for the
shorter than for the longer haul. Certainly a modest demand of justice; yet from
the first it was evident that even so modest a demand was more than could be
realized.
For, the attempt to enforce "as if" competition has to recognize the existing
actual competition and the facts of business. The rate for the shorter haul., ith
respect to which there is no competition, may be fixed at a reasonable level as if
competition existed, but the rate for the longer haul for which there is actual, ef-
fective competition is fixed by that competition without any make.believe. If the
carrier is to participate in the long haul traffic, it has to meet the competitive rate.
If that rate is lower than the non-competitive rate for the shorter haul, the carrier
has a choice of (a) reducing the short haul rate or (b) abandoning the long haul
traffic. Either course of conduct may involve a loss of revenue and either may
ultimately be detrimental to the short haul traffic. For, with participation in the
long haul and reduced short haul rates, the carrier may not be able to carry on
profitably; and by abandoning the long haul the carrier may be abandoning some
contributions to its overhead costs which will then be thrown entirely on the short
haul traffic. Which is the wiser choice and who is to make it?
Even when a carrier has well nigh a monopoly on transportation to the distant as
well as to the near point there may be reason for desiring to reduce the rates to the
former below those to the latter. Competition in the commodities carried may he as
effective for that purpose as competition in the carriage. Thus, the commodities
brought to the distant point by the carrier may there meet the competition of
similar commodities either produced at that point or brought there from elsewhere.
In order to participate in the market at the distant point, shippers without a choice
of transportation bring pressure for a reduction in rates. It may be that those
shippers have no business to attempt to reach the distant market. That also is un-
1. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. U. S., 289 U. S. 627 (1933), noted in (1933) 43 YA L.
J. 297; § 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by Act of Aug. 12, 1935, c. 509,
49 STAT. -.
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natural, uneconomic and not a part of competition as it ought to be.2 But that is
not the carrier's fault. He is simply trying tQ get along. If he reduces the rates to
the distant point, he will have the shippers' traffic to it. If he does not reduce them,
he may lose that traffic, not because a competing carrier will get it, but because there
will be no traffic. Regardless of what may be the rules of competition between
the commodities, the carrier is faced with a choice of (a) reducing his rates and
securing the traffic or (b) maintaining his rates and perhaps losing that traffic.
Either choice may result in a loss of revenue or one choice may be more profitable
than the other. Which is the wiser choice and who is to make it?
The original Act to Regulate Commerce3 prohibited the long and short haul form of
discrimination when the transportation was "under substantially similar circumstances
and conditions"; and it gave to the Commission authority to grant relief from the
prohibition in particular cases to such extent as the Commission might deem neces-
sary or desirable. Here was a determination, obviously, that the choice was not to be
left egclusively and unqualifiedly to the carrier. Ten years later the Supreme Court
held that rail as well as water competition for transportation to the distant point
was a dissimilar circumstance or condition which warranted the carrier in making
his choice without aid or hindrance from the Commission.4 Since competition was
the chief cause for the discrimination and competition was, thus, also a circumstance
which automatically withdrew the discrimination from the prohibition, therd was very
little left for the Commission in the authority to grant relief. The prohibition was
emasculated,--but only to be rejuvenated thirteen years later by the Mann-Elkins
Act, which made the prohibition absolute, subject only to authority in the Com-
mission to grant relief.5 And the Transportation Act, 1920, added some instructions
to the Commission to guide it in granting relief.0 Since the 1910 rejuvenation, a very
considerable part of the Commission's time and energies have been expended on the
long and short haul clause of the Interstate Commerce Act. And much more time
and energy might have been expended were it not for the intervention of the World
War and the period of federal control.
In his contribution in Economics to the Ohio State University Studies, Professor
Dewey tells the story of the long and short haul clause and of its administration by
the Commission. He describes the "forms and causes" of the discrimination, states the
"issues" involved, tells the short history to 1910, and details the longer subsequent
story. He relates in detail the major cases before the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in the neat order of facts, issues, arguments of parties, evidence introduced
(gleaned from the original record, not from the reported opinion only), decision of
Commission, governing principles of decision and appraisal. And he concludes with
a chapter on "Conclusions and Critique." He is on the whole complimentary to the
Commission in view of its Herculean task. But he makes some criticisms and sug-
gestions: The Commission seems to have been "unduly inconsistent in regard to the
larger issues. There is some evidence that the Commission vacillates from case to
case. ... Indeed, at no point in its administration is the Commission more confusing
than in its treatment of market competition. Either market competition does or does
not justify long and short haul discrimination .... The interpretation of the reasonably
compensatory clause has been illogical [because water competition seems to be
irrelevant to this issue7 and because no "extended" attention in all cases was paid to
2. Cf. FEttER, THE MASQUERADE Or MONOPOLY (1931).
3. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, § 4, 24 STAT. 379.
4. I. C. C. v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 168 U. S. 144 (1897).
S. Act of June 18, 1910, 36 STAT. 539.
6. Act of Feb. 28, 1920, 41 STAT. 456, 480, 49 U. S. C. § 4.
7. Section 4, supra note 6, provides that "in exercising the authority conferred upon It
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the fair rate of return] and otherwise unsound ["legally" unsound because Senator
Townsend who introduced the amendment and Senator Cummins who explained it to
the Senate seem to have interpreted it differently; "economically" unsound because
the long haul rate should be at least 76 per cent of the average operating costs, in
order to contribute its share to maintenance, rather than at least 50 per cent.]" For
the future, the Commission should make its fourth section hearings more orderly and
intelligible and it should write better opinions by moulding them in the suggested
pattern of (a) statement of issues, (b) statement of facts, (c) statement of argu-
ments by the parties, (d) "concise rendering" of the principles and evidence which
govern the decision.8
The book is, indeed, a contribution,-such as a lawyer might well have made to
legal studies. There is still room for another contribution by an economist. The
burden of deciding whether or not the discrimination should be made is now de-
finitely on the Commission. Why? And, therefore, by what tests is the determina-
tion to be made? Is the Commission given this burden only in order to guard against
ill-advised and ill-motivated judgment on the part of private management? And,
therefore, is the Commission to be guided by the same test that should guide wise and
well informed management, that is, what is for the greater profit of the carrier? If
so, information as to costs is, of course, vital. The railroads, and the Commission,
have developed some very scientific looking techniques of cost accounting. But
Professor Dewey would probably readily agree that the certitude of the exact figures
is largely illusion; that they are "averages," approximations and the results of more
or less arbitrary and purposeful judgments.9 They are, of course, good enough, or very
good, for certain purposes, but not as exact indicators of "true" costs. What, indeed,
are the elements of cost to be included? May the Commission take into account some
so-called social costs? May it consider the effect on the employment of railroad labor?
May it consider at least the effect upon employment at the near and the distant
points, if not at other places whence competitive commodities are shipped? May it
consider the effects upon population distribution? May it take into account existing
conditions in industry apart from transportation, existing locations chosen for whatever
reason but having real present needs apart from "long-run" tendencies and effects?
Of course the Commission is not supposed to be an omnipotent economic planning
body. Its powers even today are limited. It cannot operate on a total situation, even
in cases of discrimination, so as to afford "complete" relief or "complete" justice.
But, perhaps, the Commission's deliberations are not free from such questions. Per-
haps that is one reason why its decisions may not seem to be always consistent.
Perhaps that is why the Commission has not said, what it seems easy to say, that
market competition does or does not justify fourth section relief. Discrimination
in the civilized sense is essential in rate making, particularly when the commodities
carried are as numerous and diverse as those carried by railroads. An exact cost-finding
method still needs to be discovered. And it would be grand if a study would be made of
... the Commission shall not psrrmit the establishment of any charge to or from the more
distant point that is not reasonably compensatory for the service performed." In the
Transcontinental Cases of 1922, 74 I. C. C. 4S at 71, the CommLi on enumerates some re-
quirements of the "reasonably compensatory" clause, among them being the requirement
that the rate be not so low as to threaten extinction of existing competition by "w, ater
carriers." In the General Order of the Commision, printed as an Appendix to Prof.
Dewey's book (p. 265, 267), the requirements of the Transconthb:ental Cases opinion are
restated, but the phrase there is "other carriers," not water carriers. Prof. Dewey makes no
explanation of the discrepancy.
8. Pp. 257-261.
9. See D-zms, The Price of Transportation Service (1932) 45 et seq.
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the consequences, for the railroads, for shippers and for localities, of specific instance&.
of long and short haul discrimination.
Yale Law School HARRY SHULIAN"
THE FANE FRAGMENT OF THE 1461 LoRDs' JOURNAL. Edited by William Huse Dun-
ham, Jr. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1935. pp. 108.
THIs document was in all probability part of the evidence gathered by Mary Neville,
sole child of Henry Neville, Lord Bergavenny, and her husband, Sir Thomas Fane, to,
support their claim to her father's barony against the heirs male, Sir Edward Neville
and Edward his son, to whom the castle and lordship of Bergavenny had passed under
an entail established by their common ancestor, Sir George Neville. The two Edward
Nevilles seem to have advanced two main arguments-a woman was not a fit person
to hold the dignity of baron B'ergavenny and the barony was one of tenure and hence
belonged to him who had possession of the castle and lordship. The Fane fragment
bears on both these points. It shows Sir Edward Neville, grandfather of the Sir
George who entailed the estates, sitting in Parliament as Lord Bergavenny by right of
his wife, Elizabeth Beauchamp, and apparently enjoying the precedence of the Beau-
champ barons of Bergavenny. Furthermore, in 1461 the castle and lordship were
in the possession of Richard Neville, earl of Warwick, and hence Sir Edward could
not be said to have held the baronial dignity by right of tenure. While the recogni-
tion of Sir Edward as Baron Bergavenny can be proved by the writs of summons,
it may well have seemed important to show that he actually sat in Parliament and
possibly to establish the precedence he enjoyed. I suspect that a close examination
of the State Papers and Cecil papers relating to this controversy would reveal how
this document was used. I might add that the dispute was eventually settled in true
Jacobean fashion by summoning Edward Neville as Lord Bergavenny and "restoring"
Mary Fane to the more ancient barony of Le Despencer.
Professor Dunham has shown himself the ideal editor. He makes an exact tran-
scription of his text and furnishes a facsimile by which his work may be verified. But
the true quality of an editor is shown in his notes and appendices. In this connection I
need only say that with one exception, which I shall discuss later, every question which
rose to my mind as I read the document was answered or at least considered by Mr.
Dunham, and all relevant information was supplied on each point. That is indeed
an editorial triumph. Finally in his commentary Professor Dunham discusses thor-
oughly and clearly the value of the Fane fragment to the historians. If he some-
what overstresses the importance of knowing just who sat on those seven days in
the Parliament of 1461, he does not take too seriously the more technical phases of con-
stitutional history. I was particularly delighted by note 35 on page 45 in which he gently
chides the devoteesof*biological evolution in institutional history. At the same time he
lays due stress on the very important information which his document supplies about
fifteenth-century Parliamentary procedure.
There is one point upon which Mr. Dunham fails to satisfy my curiosity. How
were the lists of lords compiled and has the order any significance? The a and b
before the names of Clinton and trey of Ruthin on the last page of the fragment seems
to indicate that the order was considered important. This would lead one to assume
that the names were listed in order of precedence. If such be the case, the days
covered by the Fane fragment must have seen several controversies on this question.
On the first list the lords Scrope of Upsal, Dudley, Dacre, and La Warr appear in
that order. In the second Dacre is placed before Dudley. This arrangement con-
tinues until the fifth list when a new order is established-Dudley, La Warr, Dacre,
Scrope of Upsal. The same fifth list reverses the relative positions of Wenlock ana
t Associate Professor of Law.
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Cromwell. The only other change in order among the temporal peers is the loss of
two places by Lovell in the seventh list. In short, the order of listing the names of
the peers is dearly not purely fortuitous as it appears to be in the lists of summonses
issued. There is a regular arrangement in which certain changes are made. If I am
correct in believing that the barons are listed in the order of precedence as recognized
in 1461, the Fane fragment should be of unusual interest to students of the peerage.
SIDNEY PAxNTRuxd
Baltimore, Md.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES. By Charles T. McCormick. The
Foundation Press, Chicago. Pp. xv, 798. 1935.
IN his preface, Professor McCormick rightly points out that the law of damages
has been slighted in most law school curriculums in recent years. He might well have
added that this indifference to the law of damages has in turn resulted in a deplorable
paucity of good teaching material in this field. Quite happily, there seems to be a
distinct change in this attitude at the present time. More and more law schools are
giving increased attention to Damages, while this in turn has caused a re-examination
of the teaching materials, and an increased productivity in their publication. This
case book by Professor McCormick is not only the latest case book on Damages, but
it is easily the best ever published, and, perhaps we may say, the only thorough one
that has ever appeared. The case books by Professor Beale and others were not
fully annotated in the law of damages in a manner comparable to the case books of
Dean Ames on Trusts of an earlier day, and any number of case books that are now
published in other fields of the law.
The case book itself is divided into five parts: L Rules and Standards Applicable
Generally; II. Damages in Tort Actions; III. Compensation for Property Taken by
the Public; IV. Damages for Breach of Contract; V. Procedure. Part I covers Value,
Interest, Expenses of Litigation, Certainty, and Avoidable Consequences, and Credit
for Benefit Accompanying Injury. The other Parts have separate chapters dealing
with type situations or problems which arise within their respective spheres. For
instance, exemplary Damages are treated quite properly in Part II, while Liquidated
Damages are treated under Part IV. The factual approach seems to be somewhat
arbitrarily prominent in chapter 16 in Part IV which covers "construction contracts."
As a matter of common law rights in the analytical sense, there is no such thing as
"construction contracts." All the other divisions of the case book correspond at
least roughly with analytical concepts of the common law. No doubt the editor feels
that the peculiar importance of construction contracts and the peculiar attitude of
the courts in construing legal concepts which arise in construction contract cases are
sufficient justification for this factual approach.
Throughout the book the cases are admirably selected from the point of view of
presenting not only the law of damages in an analytical sense, but presenting fact situa-
tions that bring out the significance of the law in particular situations of the present
day. I often think that the modem method of selecting a case not only for its con-
cepts, but for its facts, is perhaps very much the same thing as what the editors of
earlier case books did, when they sought for the "teachable" case in their search for
purely analytical material. In a word, we today are not the first to pay attention
to the facts for their own sake, but the change in law teaching and in case book con-
struction is nevertheless important, because we now do consciously and critically
what was formerly done, if at all, unconsciously and indirectly. Of the principal cases
given, Professor McCormick has included 44 cases decided before 1900, 70 between
1900 and 1920, 56 between 1920 and 1930, and 35 since 1930. This means that he
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has put the load on the recent cases in a very striking way. While it may be said,
without disrespect to the courts, that these cases are not clearer or more teachable
than the older cases of traditional use, so far as skill of judicial opinion goes, never-
theless, both teachers and students are indebted to Professor McCormick for his skill
in selecting recent cases and his judgment in letting them carry the major part of
the course.
Throughout the book, the "notes" and "problems" are excellent. In the problems
the editor follows the practice of stating his problem and then giving a particular case
which, roughly, is supposed to explain or answer the problem itself. I would have
been grateful if the editor had elected to frame a number of hypothetical problems
which are not covered on their peculiar facts by any decided cases at present. Then
the instructor could discuss these problems in view of the case material that can be
presented on either side. If it be answered that each instructor should prepare these
problems, and that the editor should not intrude, in this field, I feel the answer is
that problems of this hypothetical nature are stimulating to both instructor and stu-
dent, and they do not in the least preclude the instructor from framing others of his
own.
Professor McCormick emphasizes the procedural side of Damages, allocating his
fifth Part to this entirely, and placing great emphasis on the procedural aspect through-
out the cases. He includes matters pertaining to Pleadings and Evidence in giving
the opinions, making it possible for the student to see the damage problem at all stages
of a law suit. Perhaps my only question about the general plan of the case book is
whether Professor McCormick has gone far enough in this direction. The problem
of damages is so peculiarly tied up with Pleading and with Evidence that it may be
considered in a broad sense as essentially a part of adjective law, rather than sub-
stantive law at all. Surely, the tendency now is to state the substantive law in terms
of positive rights. In this sense, the damages are a part of the method by which one
enforces his rights, rather than the rights themselves. Thus, I thing it analytically
sound to consider Damages as a part of the adjective law, and I think it decidedly de-
sirable from a practical point of view.
Consequently it may be preferable to allocate questions of damages incident to lia-
bility to the courses in Contracts and Torts and Property, while the bulk of the law
of damages in determining the value of the plaintiff's interests and the plaintiff's
various duties which he must perform before collecting for injury to his interests
be allocated to the course in Civil Procedure? The course in Civil Procedure deals
with the adjective law side of all the substantive law courses. Would it not be
better to consider most of the law of damages here in both practical and theoretical
connection with the particular legal remedies employed? An allocation of most of
the law of damages to the course in Civil Procedure would be advantageous to the
student in ways: He would learn more about damages, and understand it more fully
because of its treatment incident to Procedure, and he would understand his pleading
and his other procedural technique more fully if he saw its application to the damages
he hopes to secure in the particular law suit.
Certainly we have slighted the law of damages in recent years. Professor McCor-
mick's excellent case book now makes it possible to consider the subject in its en-
tirety in a separate course. Those law schools which prefer to continue in their effort
to consider Damages incident to other courses must face the fact that they are not
doing so now, and that they are not likely to do so in the future unless they include
a substantial amount of materials on the law of damages incident to their other courses.
PAUL L. SAYREI
Iowa City, Ia.
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